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There is nothing like a powerful empirical randomized study to help clean
old theories out of the attic and replace them with fresher and empirically
more compelling ones. With this randomized study of the Quick Enroll-
ment plan, the team of Choi, Laibson, and Madrian have added to their
remarkable series of experiments on how 401(k) plan structures aﬀect sav-
ing behavior. The experiment provides insights for two theoretical areas:
the economics of savings and the economics of choice. I’ll consider each in
turn.
In the conventional model of lifecycle saving, individual agents maxi-
mize utility over their lifespan by smoothing consumption—or more pre-
cisely, by ensuring that all appropriate Euler-equation conditions are
satisﬁed. Thus saving is simply a residual between earnings and optimally
chosen consumption. In a series of papers, Madrian and colleagues have
forced us to think quite diﬀerently about savings in optimizing models.
First, in Madrian and Shea (2001), we found that the default matters; when
new employees must opt out of a 401(k) saving plan, rather than having to
opt into a 401(k) plan, they are far more likely to save more, at least within
the 401(k). The result does not provide very strong support for our con-
ventional models of saving: if something as trivial as a default rule could
have a long-term impact on saving and hence on consumption, then we
must conclude that these marginal savers aren’t doing a very good job of
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just the default option matters; employee saving decisions are quite sensi-
tive not just to default rules, but to a variety of other dimensions in the
401(k) plan.
And in this chapter, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian study an experiment in
which workers are oﬀered a quick enrollment option for the 401(k). Strictly
speaking, it is not a default plan, because it requires an active choice to
check the “yes” box, but it does constrain the worker into choosing a very
conservative contribution rate (2 or 3 percent) and asset allocation (in one
case, just money market accounts). Does this experiment by itself shed new
light on saving behavior that we didn’t know before? Yes, but not much. If
workers were willing to be pushed into default saving plans, then it’s not
too surprising that the ease of checking a box on a form should have simi-
larly long-term saving eﬀects in perhaps a suboptimal long-term saving
plan.1
Does this experiment tell us a great deal more about models of economic
choice? Here the answer is yes. Economists have generally assumed that
more choice is better in an almost tautological sense. But the burgeoning
empirical evidence seems to suggest that too many options can actually
discourage consumers from making choices even when those choices are
probably beneﬁcial. And this chapter provides another important piece of
evidence against the notion that more choice is better. Indeed, too many
401(k) choices can result in no 401(k) at all.
While this is news to economists, sociologists and marketing experts
have known this for years. One book by Steven Cristol and Peter Sealey
gives away the punch line in the title: Simplicity Marketing: End Brand
Complexity, Clutter, and Confusion. And in the famous 1970 book Future
Shock, Alvin Toﬄer wrote:
Today in the techno-societies there is an almost ironclad consensus
about the future of freedom. Maximum individual choice is regarded as
the democratic ideal. Yet most writers . . . conjure up a dark vision of
the future, in which people appear as mindless consumer-creatures, sur-
rounded by standardized goods, educated in standardized schools, fed
a diet of standardized mass culture, and forced to adopt standardized
styles of life. (p. 263)
Ironically, the people of the future may suﬀer not from an absence of
choice, but from a paralyzing surfeit of it. They may turn out to be vic-
tims of that peculiarly super-industrial dilemma: overchoice. (p. 264)
A more scientiﬁc test of this “paralyzing surfeit” is provided in Gourville
and Soman (2006), who adopted Toﬄer’s label of “overchoice” in their
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1. This also presumes that workers are not oﬀsetting 401(k) contributions by reducing sav-
ing in non-401(k) forms. Madrian and Shea (2001) found no evidence of substitution with
perhaps their closest substitute: non-401(k) employee saving plans.study of consumer choice behavior. They conducted several experiments
on consumers at shopping malls. In one experiment, consumers were told:
“Imagine that you are planning to buy a microwave oven. At the store, you
will ﬁnd the following alternatives.” They would then provide subjects with
a description of diﬀerent microwaves as options, always with a “lone” brand
(sometimes Panasonic, sometimes Sharp) matched with from one to ﬁve
microwaves produced by the “alternative” brand (again either Sharp or Pan-
asonic). The outcome variable was the percentage of times that one of the
alternative brand choices was chosen.
There were two diﬀerent classes of options, alignable and nonalignable.
Alignable choices corresponded to diﬀerent values along a given dimen-
sion, for example the size of the microwave. For the alignable choice, the
power output, warranty, and features were held constant for both the tar-
get microwave and up to ﬁve alternatives. The alternatives varied only on
the basis of capacity and price; ranging from 1.1 cubic feet (at a price of
$140) to 1.9 cubic feet (at a price of $220), depending on the number of
choices.
Nonalignable choices were options that were more diﬃcult to compare.
For these hypothetical microwaves, the options provided identical capac-
ity (1.1 cubic feet) and power output, but the features diﬀer across prices
and the ﬁve alternative choices: on-line help, adjustable speed turntable,
moisture sensor, hold warm features, and programmable menus.
The results were striking. When there were more alignable options, con-
sumers were more likely to choose one of the oﬀered options (rather than
the lone brand). With one option, they chose the target brand slightly more
than 50 percent; with four or ﬁve options they chose the target brand
slightly less than 80 percent of the time. By contrast, oﬀering more than
two nonalignable options led to a decline in the likelihood that one of the
alternative options would be chosen. When there were four to ﬁve non-
alignable options, the choice of one of these target options dropped to just
40 percent.
These results make perfect intuitive sense. I can easily judge whether I
want a bigger or smaller microwave based on past experiences of trying to
ﬁt plates or trays into them. But comparing adjustable speed with on-line
help—I wouldn’t have a clue. It’s easiest to make no choice at all.
The analogy applies as well to the case of Quick Enrollment. With so
many complex options, it’s just easier to choose just one option, even if that
option may not be perfectly suited to one’s long-term saving plans. (The
model is a little more complex here, because of the option to not contribute
at all.) And the lessons from this research apply as well to the design of
401(k) programs. First, expanding the choice set along an alignable di-
mension, like the percentage of income to contribute, could actually in-
crease the percentage of workers who sign up. Thus one could imagine
three diﬀerent subgroups for saving: Quick Enrollment Basic (2 percent of
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persaver (6 percent).
Second, there are inherent nonalignable choices that need to be made in
making investments. How can one really compare Japanese stock funds,
inﬂation-indexed bonds, or high-yield corporate bonds? Choosing a de-
fault of money market accounts may protect ﬁrms from legal suits in the
event that the (say) Japanese stock market implodes, but it’s not really the
best approach to saving for retirement. Perhaps collapsing these non-
alignable choices to something that sounds alignable—like “low growth/
low risk,” “middle growth/middle risk,” and “high growth/high risk” would
be one approach to strike a middle ground between a paralyzing surfeit of
choice and the absence of any choice at all.
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